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ABSTRACT 
In secure communications networks there are a great 
number of user behavioral problems, which need to be 
dealt with. Curious players pose a very real and serious 
threat to the integrity of such a network. By traversing a 
network a Curious player could uncover secret informa-
tion, which that user has no need to know, by simply pos-
ing as a loyalty check. Loyalty checks are done simply to 
gauge the integrity of the network with respect to players 
who act in a malicious manner. We wish to propose a 
method, which can deal with Curious players trying to ob-
tain "Need to Know" information using a combined Fault-
tolerant, Cryptographic and Game Theoretic Approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a curious player in a network was first used 
to describe a method of information extraction. We exam-
ine how curious players use the network structure to ex-
tract information from other players.  This behavior 
doesn’t necessarily present a clear danger to the integrity  
of the network and thus could easily go unnoticed.  
 
The current literature uses game theory to model the be-
havior of networks of this type to try and find and elimi-
nate errors. We will introduce the use of games and fault 
tolerance to build the structure for our own work.  
 
We introduce via well-established methods within mecha-
nism design, a protocol that will outplay this type of be-
havior and place well-defined rules on each player. By 
standardizing the way in which each player receives and 
deals with packets of information we can place restrictions 
on each players set of possible moves. These restrictions 
and game design allow us to present a cryptographic and 
game theoretic methodology to uncover and eliminate cu-
rious players within secure networks. 
BYZANTINE AGREEMENTS IN SECURE 
COMMUNICATION 
 
The Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) is the original and 
most fundamental ways to reach agreement in a distributed 
system [2]. The best way to conceptualise the BGP is to 
use the example of the Byzantine army poised for attack 
[4]. The Army is comprised of divisions each commanded 
by a general. Having sent out observers the general must 
decide on a course of action. This must be a collective de-
cision based on all the available facts and played out by 
each division in unison.  
 
However in some cases there may be a traitor. We should 
also note that in the model presented in [4], the location of 
the commanding general, or for that matter the traitors 
does not need to be taken into account. 
 
Broadcasting guarantees the recipient of a message that 
everyone else has received the same message. This guaran-
tee may no longer exist in a setting in which communica-
tion is peer-to-peer and some of the people within this 
network are traitors. In this type of setting a Byzantine 
Agreement offers the next best thing to a broadcast. 
 
Byzantine Agreements (BA) are used widely as a method 
for fault tolerance in distributed systems. A critical exam-
ple of their use is in bus systems, where fault tolerance 
maintains aircraft reliability (Rushby [12]). 
 
The original literature of Lamport [4,5] and Pease [10] 
creates the possibility of using such an idea to maintain 
secure communication. The use of a more formalized ver-
sion of the Byzantine Generals Problem is investigated in 
section 3 of Wagner [14], using the developments of Pease 
and Lamport [10,4].  
 
The development of Byzantine Agreements in a secure 
communication environment in Linial [6], provides us with 
a wide-ranging insight into how BA's can be used to estab-
lish protocols for secure communication.  
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CURIOUS PLAYERS 
 
The main danger in not seeking out curiosity is the possi-
bility of attack by some third party who has undermined 
the network by having been dealt information from the 
curious player.  
 
A curious player is often defined as being someone who 
simply seeks out information that they may or may not 
have the right/need to know. What we must do now is 
make a more formal effort to describe this behaviour. 
 
• Traverse the network to uncover and collect as 
much information that is available throughout the 
system.  
• Players use the trust and loyalty of other players 
with access to alternate information. 
• Store all messages seen throughout the duration of 
the player’s presence within the network. 
• Traitors collaborate to extract as much information 
as possible from the network using multiple at-
tempts. 
Although this definition of a curious player may seem a 
little vague, one must remember that this type of attack is 
completely subversive. This also leads to the proposition 
that curious players are passing this information to some 
attacker outside the network. Opponents, which rely on 
this type of information retrieval, are highly motivated and 
have inside knowledge of the structure and organization of 
the network being attacked. 
 
In a conventional network the grand designer may be un-
aware of the amount of information flowing to all the other 
players. Although many organizations have the concept of 
a registry operating to keep track of who is reading what, 
there are still many avenues for discovery. Curious players 
use the trust placed in them by loyal players to discover 
information by other means.  
 
Currently the methods used to uncover traitors, have been 
focused on malicious players, whose intent is to destroy 
the integrity of the network [6]. This paper tries to recog-
nize the significance of players residing in the network, 
using its structure to undermine the capacity of the grand 
designer to limit information dispersal to the outside 
world. 
 
The possibility of having players inside a network becom-
ing curious is too great. The danger, which is demonstrated 
by the mere possibility of an outside agent finding out in-
formation from a curious player, should be enough for net-
work designers to consider using an active method of de-
terrent. 
 
What the current literature doesn't provide for are meas-
ures, which could actively deter curiosity [6]. The active 
search for members within the network is something, 
which has long been over due. The acceptance by the 
grand designer that this type of situation will happen is a 
more viable option than a simple deterrent protocol as out-
lined in [6]. 
 
Other methods in secure communication search for 
users who try to recombine access structures, which 
they may not be permitted to do. This is also a useful 
proposition but doesn’t actively seek out curiosity 
amongst those with access but who lack the need to 
know. 
 
Without questioning all players on what they have distrib-
uted across the network the grand designer is helpless. The 
active and continual search for the likely traitors in this 
type of network adds a great deal to the general integrity 
testing and vetting processes of high security environ-
ments. 
 
MECHANISM DESIGN 
 
We wish to reverse engineer the way in which this type of 
game is played out. Implementation theory or mechanism 
design allows us to examine the inverse approach so as to 
fix a set of outcomes and look at the game form which yi-
elds the required set of outcomes as equilibria [9]. 
 
To institute a scheme to outwit this type of behavior we 
must place certain rules on each player. By standardizing 
the way in which each player receives and deals with 
packets of information we can place restrictions on each 
players set of possible moves. 
 
• Each Player keeps 2 information sets 
o Information gathered or created. 
o Information transferred by other players. 
o These two sets are partioned to allow for both 
digital signatures which are applied to docu-
ments and full documents.  
• Maintenance of two information sets, which are all, 
transferred in unison to the grand designer. 
• Grand Designer searches each set of values to deter-
mine who has been curious and not disclosed their en-
tire second information set. 
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In order to visualize the information flow in within the 
network as a loyalty check is performed we have included 
figure 1. This figure shows how information, which origi-
nates within the confidential level, is passed upwards 
through the other two clearances and also to the grand de-
signer. In this case the grand designer will act as a registry 
and also communicate with the higher levels to assert the 
loyalty of each player. 
 
Figure 1: Upward Information Flow 
 
PROTOCOLS 
 
The protocols, which we wish to implement in this situa-
tion, are rather simple and based around common practices 
within secure communication. We refer the reader to 
Menezes et al. [8] for a complete outline of the common 
methods used to encrypt information.   
 
We shall now propose a procedure for the safe transmis-
sion of inter-clearance level information to be used in loy-
alty checks. This method blinds the information set of each 
player while still allowing for a direct comparison. Even 
though the information has been digitally signed and thus 
unreadable, one can still compare two information sets. If 
two information sets are identical then the digital signa-
ture, which is applied, should yield the same result. The 
combination of a digital signature and a document is 
unique and reproducible [8]. Thus one can still compare 
information sent around the network. 
 
 
Protocol for Inter-Clearance Levels: 
I. Bundle all Information (Catalogue Information). 
II. Apply Digital Signature (Blinding Phase). 
III. Encrypt using a Public Key System. 
IV. Transmission Phase (Sender) 
• Register information and pretext of transfer 
with grand designer. 
V. Decrypt and Comparison Phase (Receiver) 
• Register receipt of information with grand de-
signer.  
 
We must formally introduce a procedure for members of a 
clearance level to check the information dispersal amongst 
their peers. This protocol allows for the full documents to 
be compared, which allows for people with the need to 
know a broader insight into the amount and type of infor-
mation, which is being collected.  
Protocol for Intra-Clearance Levels: 
I. Bundle and Encrypt Information using Public Key 
System. 
II. Transmission Phase (Sender) 
• Register information and pretext of transfer 
with grand designer. 
III. Decrypt and Comparison Phase (Receiver) 
• Register receipt of information with grand de-
signer.  
 
Theorem 1. The protocol reveals which members of the 
network are curious players. 
Proof. Suppose that there exists a curious player. Since the 
transmission of any information is logged and registered, 
the curious players information set would be clear to other 
players. Furthermore each player must transmit his or her 
information set in a synchronous manner around the net-
work. Thus for a curious player to succeed and evade the 
vetting of information dispersal they would have to con-
vince other players of the inaccuracy of their peers regis-
try. Due to the complex nature and size of a network, 
which obeys the Byzantine Agreement protocols in Wag-
ner [14], a curious player would be out numbered by loyal 
players. 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
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Systems like this have been implemented before for find-
ing traitors in secure networks. But what make this work 
unique is that little has been done to engage the work of 
game theory to reveal traitors. 
However the current literature, which explores secure net-
works, assumes that the network will be robust and reli-
able. This approach simply assumes that the traitors will be 
flushed out by other means [7]. These procedures don't 
allow for active search of curious players and the exclu-
sion of traitors within the network via mechanism design. 
These restrictions and game design will allow us to use a 
cryptographic and game theoretic solution to uncover and 
eliminate curious players within secure networks. 
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